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ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES: A LESSON
FROM THE OREGON LEGISLATURE
Anna M Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the 72nd Oregon Legislative Assembly convened in Salem in 2003, Senate
Bill 2971 was proposed to offer a new dimension for Oregon environmental policy. The
bill introduced an all-sums 2 approach to environmental cleanup and the coverage
entitled under comprehensive general liability insurance policies. An all-sums approach
means that subject only to the limitations of the policy, the insurer remains responsible
to pay the insured for all sums that result from a cleanup.3 This rule enables the insured
to choose the policy (if the insured held different policies over a period of years) from
which to collect all of its cleanup costs. The insurance company chosen to pay the costs
then pays the insured all sums due for the cleanup up to the policy's limit. The insurer
then turns to other possibly liable insurance companies for indemnification.
Other states adopted the all-sums approach through case law, but the Oregon
Legislature went a step further and mandated the all-sums approach through statute.
4
What the bill could do for small businesses, insurance companies, and environmental
cleanup required consideration as the legislature met to discuss the bill's finer points.
The ultimate passage of the bill and the language of its text suggests, however, much
more than just these considerations. What the bill entails and what it accomplishes for
environmental cleanup in Oregon reflects more of the growing environmental concern
in the Pacific Northwest. Many people within this region seek more rigorous standards
and tougher sanctions in order to protect the many rivers, lakes, ponds, and delicate
ecosystems that help comprise the national ideal of Oregonian wilderness and the
livelihood of those who exist on Oregon's landscape.
This Note examines the Oregon Legislature's approach to environmental cleanup
and insurance policy coverage as it compares to case law in other states. Part II
examines the different approaches used by some states, including the all-sums approach
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Notre Dame Law School. The author would like to thank Mark
Nelson for the idea behind this Note, everyone on the Journal of Legislation for their editing suggestions, and
her parents for their support and insight.
1. The bill revised OR. REV. STAT. § 465.475 and § 465.480 (2004).
2. See Christopher R. Hermann et al., The Unanswered Question of Environmental Insurance Allocation
in Oregon Law, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1131, 1137-38 (2003).
3. Id.
4. See supra note 1.
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adopted by Oregon, the time-on-the-risk approach,5 and a mixture of the time-on-the-
risk approach and the percentage of coverage approach. Part III proposes a view on the
reasons the Oregon Legislature took the issue a step further and wrote the all-sums
approach into statute, and it draws on ideas of what this bill could mean for future
claims within the state. Finally, Part IV recommends Oregon as a model for undecided
states to examine as they shape their own environmental insurance policies.
II. CASE LAW ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND INSURANCE APPROACHES
Over the past few years, courts reached different conclusions on how defense and
cleanup costs should gain apportionment among various insurance companies when a
number of different policies insured the contaminated area over a period of years.
Theoretically, an insured with one environmental spill where the damage spanned a
twenty-year period could hold twenty different policies for each different year with
twenty different insurance companies. Each company either could hold responsibility
for all the damage or only part of the damage for the years where it acted as the insurer.
Significant problems arise when the extent of damage for each individual year remains
unknown, and most often, unknowable. 6  Different court decisions show strong
differences in the interval of time for the cleanup and the amount of litigation that can
ensue before a cleanup's conclusion.
A. Interpreting Insurance Policies
In an examination of these policies, it is essential to know the basic rules of
insurance policy interpretation. One basic feature of insurance policy interpretation, as
most of these cases demonstrate, is that courts interpret ambiguous provisions according
to the "insured's objectively reasonable expectations." 7 If this rule fails to correct the
problem or resolve the issue, then courts construe the provision in question in a light
most favorable to the insured.8  This parallels the general contract theory that
ambiguous terms in a contract are construed against the drafter. The drafter determines
the provisions and defines the words included in a contract; therefore, she holds the
greatest opportunity to clarify any terms that could lead to confusion. Public policy
helps dictate that an insurer's failure to do this should not result in any hardship to the
insured, as ample opportunity existed for the insurer to correct any potential problems
during the drafting process.
5. The time-on-the-risk approach:
allocates damages based on the relative period of time during which coverage was provided by
each insurer's respective policies. Under this method, each triggered policy would bear a share of
the total damages proportionate to the number of years it was on the risk relative to the total
number of years of coverage triggered.
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997).
6. See Hermann, supra note 2, at 1160.
7. Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1, 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
8. See id. See also Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 492 (Del. 2001); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., Inc. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 923 P.2d 1200, 1205 (Or. 1992); Am. Nat'l
Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 256 (Wash. 1998).
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B. Approaches from All-Sums States-Case Law
Prior to the proposed all-sums statute in Oregon, a number of states adopted the all-
sums approach through case law.9 In fact, states making the all- sums determination are
currently in the majority. One illustrative example of this arises in Aerojet-General
Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co., wherein the California Supreme Court handed
down a decision adopting this manner of indemnification. In this case, Aerojet, as a
manufacturer of aerospace and defense products, discharged certain substances that
caused damage to the ground and groundwater in an ongoing and continuous manner.11
In its adoption of the all-sums rule, the court stated, "[I]f specified harm is caused
by an included occurrence and results, at least in part, within the policy period, it
perdures to all points of time at which some such harm results thereafter."' 12 The court
continued on to state that even if the triggering event 13 of insurance coverage remains
subject to the policy's coverage, this time period fails to limit the final amount paid by
the insurer. 14 In sum, a triggering event can only occur during the policy period in
order to necessitate the insurer's duty to pay. Once an event triggers an insurance
policy's coverage, the amount that the insurer may need to pay in defense and
indemnification costs remains unlimited. The duty to indemnify does not end once the
policy expires if the triggering event occurs during the policy period. Under this
analysis, the court reached the conclusion that each insurance carrier bears potential
liability for the entire amount of costs. 
15
The court also makes an interesting examination of general contract principles in its
explanation. The court states, "But the pertinent policies provide what they provide.
Aerojet and the insurers were generally free to contract as they pleased." 16 One concern
9. See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 919-20 (Cal. 1997); Armstrong World
Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co.,
784 A.2d 481, 489 (Del. 2001); Rubenstein v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 694 N.E.2d 381, 388 (Mass. App. Ct.
1998); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ohio 2002); J.H. France
Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507-09 (Pa. 1993); Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L
Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 256 (Wash. 1998).
10. 948 P.2d 909, 919-20 (Cal. 1997).
11. Id. at 912.
12. Id. at 919. The court also discussed a hypothetical example in order to help clarify the matter,
stating:
[I]nsurer has a duty to indemnify Insured for those sums that the Insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages for property damage caused by its discharge of hazardous substances, up to a
limit of $1 million. Insured discharges such a substance. It thereby causes property damage to
Neighbor's land, in the amount of $100,000 (determined by the cost of returning the soil to its
original condition), within the policy period of year 1. It causes further damage of this sort as the
substance spreads under the surface, in the amount of $100,000 annually, in year two through year
thirty. Insured must pay Neighbor $3 million in damages under judgment. Insurer must pay
Insured the limit of $1 million for indemnification.
Id. at 920.
13. A triggering event is the occurrence of any event where, under the policy's terms, the insurer
becomes obligated to indemnify the insured for any damages that arise out of this event. Id. at 927.
14. Id. at 920-21. See also Armstrong World Indus., 45 Cal. App. 4th at 105 (ruling that the time of the
triggering event fails to define the extent of the policy's coverage); Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 951 P.2d at 253
(stating that after a policy is triggered, the "policy remains on the risk for continuing damage.").
15. Aerojet-General, 948 P.2d at 933.
16. Id. at 932. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 737 N.E.2d 1177, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000),
affd in part, 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1058 (Ind. 2001) (finding it necessary to write into its policies if it wanted to
2004]
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with an all-sums approach emphasizes the inequity of a requirement that one insurance
company-who perhaps acted as the insurance company for only one year-bears the
costs of damages for twenty years of pollution. One guiding principle in contract law,
though, as discussed above, showcases that parties remain free to contract for what they
want. This principle enables a party to compose contract clauses so as to include
anything they consider essential to the relationship. The court bears no duty to change
the provisions of a contract when the provisions of that contract carry unintended
results. It remains doubtful that an insurer who provided a policy for one year ever
thought that it may need to indemnify an insured for twenty years of pollution damage.
However, unintended results and significant payouts do not signify reasons to rewrite
the terms of a contract. If the parties want to limit themselves in some way, then the
contract should contain that limitation. As the court in this case stated:
As a general matter at least, we do not add to, take away from, or otherwise modify a
contract for "public policy considerations." We would certainly not do so here,
where such considerations depend in large part on the amassing and analyzing of
complex and extensive empirical data, which belong more appropriately to the
executive and legislative branches than to the judicial. We shall therefore allow
whatever "gains" and "losses" there may be to lie where they have fallen.
17
The court thus implicitly shows that requiring an insurance company to pay all-sums
that it may be required to pay under the issued policy simply adheres to basic contract
principles.
Furthermore, it remains the insurer's obligation to pay the full amount of the policy
that it issued if a triggering event of coverage occurs within the policy period. 18 When
the original contract comes into formation, the two parties agree on all the terms within
it, irrespective of any other past or future policies. Thus, as between those two parties,
when they form their contract, no other insurance policy exists. In a similar insurance
situation regarding asbestos injuries, one California court stated in its opinion, "It is
irrelevant that the damage took place across several policy periods and only a part of the
damage occurred during any particular policy period. The plain language of the policies
requires that each triggered policy respond in full." 19 Essentially, continuous damage
means no single isolated injury exists. Because the injury can extend over a period of
many years, the injury holds the potential to trigger many policies. If the insurer
wanted to contract for a provision that stated its obligation to pay for any continuous
injury would extend only for a certain period, then they could draft this into future
policies. However, because the insurers failed to do so in the policies at issue in these
release itself of the obligation to indemnify for any damage that might occur outside of the policy period).
17. Aerojet-General, 948 P.2d at 932 (citations omitted).
18. See, e.g., Armstrong World Indus., 45 Cal. App. 4th at 106.
19. Id.
20. The Washington Supreme Court also used this analysis in its holding in Am. Nat 'l Fire Ins. Co. v. B
& L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 256 (Wash. 1998). The court stated, "If the insurer wished to
limit its liability through a pro rata allocation of damages once a policy is triggered, the insurer could have
included that language in the policy." Id.
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cases, then they should not be able to backtrack on what they wrote into the original
policies.
In American National Fire Insurance Co. v. B & L Trucking & Construction Co.,
2 1
the Washington Supreme Court brought in another interesting argument in its analysis
of the all-sums approach. This court ultimately held that at the time of the policy
trigger, the insurer needed to pay all sums, up to the policy's limits.22 In reaching its
conclusion, the court, in part, applied a very strict interpretation of insurance contracts,
and seemed almost to chastise the insurance companies in the case for attempting to
suggest that something other than an all-sums approach remained equitable. The court
stated:
[An] insurance obligation is interpreted in a fashion consistent with the undertaking
described in the policy label. Insureds are not purchasing "almost comprehensive"
coverage. CGL policies are marketed by insurers as comprehensive in their scope
and should be strictly construed when the insurer attempts to subtract from the
comprehensive scope of its undertaking.
23
The Washington Supreme Court shows a very encompassing view of
comprehensive general liability insurance policies. In the above language, the court
seems to state that if a company purchases this type of insurance, it will gain
indemnification for nearly everything. 24 The court simply states that comprehensiveS25
insurance entails exactly what it reads as--comprehensive. Anything less than this
would show that the policy contains language the parties never wrote into the
contract.26 To construe the language of a contract to include something that the parties
never intended just to achieve a certain result would destroy the very purpose and
meaning behind insurance policies as contracts. The Washington Supreme Court thus
states that if the parties cannot devise ahead of time what they want to include, then the
court will not construe the policy outside of its plain language.
27
C. Time-on-the-risk and Mixed Time-on-the-risk and Percentage of Coverage
Approaches
2 8
Two alternatives to the all-sums approach exist. These alternatives are known as
time-on-the-risk and mixed time-on-the-risk and percentage of coverage. A few states
follow each of these approaches because of recent case law decided in each state.
29
21. Id.
22. Id. at 256.
23. Id. at 257.
24. This excludes coverage in the case of intentional or expected damage, a provision that most of these
policies include.
25. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 951 P.2dat 257.
26. The court states, "Further, because insurance policies are considered contracts, the policy language,
and not public policy, controls. We will not add language to the policy that the insurer did not include." Id.
27. Id.
28. Together, these are often cited as the "pro rata" rule.
29. In Consol. Edison Co. of NY v. Allstate Ins. Co, the Court of Appeals of New York also adopted a pro




Currently, four states follow the time-on-the-risk approach. The time-on-the-risk
approach essentially states that where environmental damage to property occurs
gradually and where it remains difficult to determine exactly how much damage occurs
in any one year, then the total amount of liability gets divided by the number of years at
issue. The court allocates liability for each policy year and distributes it to the insurer
for that particular year.
3 1
Colorado recently adopted the time-on-the-risk approach in 1999 with the Colorado
Supreme Court's decision in Public Service Company of Colorado v. Wallis & Cos.32
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeals, stating that it
did so in part based on interpretation of case law, and it regarded the method of
allocation used by the court of appeals as unreasonable.
33
The Colorado Supreme Court reaches for what it regards as the most equitable
result for all the parties, even at the expense of quicker environmental cleanup.34 The
court states, "[T]here is no logic to support the notion that one single insurance policy
among 20 or 30 years worth of policies could be expected to be held liable for the entire
time period." 35  The court thus implies that requiring one insurance company to
indemnify the insured for the entire period when the environmental damage occurred
would bring about an inequitable result. However, this reasoning disregards the further
damage that could happen to the property as the insured must seek out each company
under which it held a policy for the entire period of damage in order to get the full
cleanup and defense costs.
This method also fails to address the problem that would inevitably arise with lost
policies. 36 It remains quite possible that out of the thirty years when damage occurred,
many of the insurance policies that the company rightfully paid for could be lost or
without proper proof. The amount of time required to reconstruct lost policies could
entail a considerable drain on the resources of the company. This would also increase
30. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 935 (Colo. 1999); Sentinel Ins. Co. v.
First Ins. Co. of Haw., Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 919 (Haw. 1994); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins., 859 So. 2d
167, 197-98 (La. App. 2003); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Minn. 1997).
31. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 940.
32. Id. at 935.
33. Id.
34. This case dealt with soil and ground water contamination at two different sites. See id. at 927-28.
35. Id. at 940.
36. This problem is not adequately addressed through adoption of an all sums approach by case law
either. However, through the all sums approach, at least the cleanup could move forward during the time
period the parties reconstructed the lost policies. This highlights another area where the Oregon Legislature
successfully adopted a pro-policyholder stance. The revised statute allows for a cooperative investigation
between the insured and the insurer to reconstruct or discover lost policies. The statute states:
If, based on the information discovered in an investigation of a lost policy, the insured can show by
a preponderance of the evidence that a general liability insurance policy was issued to the insured
by the insurer, then if: (a) the insured cannot produce evidence that tends to show the policy limits
applicable to the policy, it shall be assumed that the minimum limits of coverage, including any
exclusions to coverage, offered by the insurer during the period in question were purchased by the
insured. (b) The insured can produce evidence that tends to show the policy limits applicable to
the policy, then the insurer has the burden of proof to show that a different policy limit, including
any exclusions to coverage, should apply.
OR. REV. STAT. § 465.479(6) (2003).
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the amount of litigation that could ensue if the insurer challenges the provisions of the
lost policy. All of the time and money spent on seeking out each insurance company to
indemnify the right share of the claim and the time spent on reconstructing lost policies
signifies time better spent on cleaning up the area. Because the indemnification
payments become stalled due to the requirement of the insured to seek payments for
each policy held, the cleanup at the site slows.
2. Mixed Time-on-the-Risk and Percentage of Coverage Approach
Under the mixed time-on-the-risk and percentage of coverage approach, the amount
due in indemnification is divided among the insurance companies according to the time
period in which they acted as an insurer and the percentage of coverage they offered.
37
The Utah Supreme Court adopted this approach in a 1997 decision. 38 In that decision,
the question of insurance allocation arose in the area of defense costs.39 From 1984 to
1986, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that property owned by Sharon
Steel Corporation, acquired from UV Industries, posed a threat to public health.40 It
then brought an action against Sharon Steel, UV Industries, and the Liquidating Trust
for liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Acte and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 42 for site cleanup
costs at the property. 43 During most the of time that UV Industries conducted business,
it held comprehensive general liability insurance policies from three companies, Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, and
American Motorists Insurance Company (AMICO).44
After the Liquidating Trust provided notice to the insurance companies of the
proceedings, Hartford and Aetna began to pay defense costs, although Hartford
restricted its coverage to a pro rata formula of its coverage years, and AMICO never
paid anything.4 5  After different rulings by the trial court, settlements, and cross-
claims, 46 the Utah Supreme Court determined that when two or more co-insurers exist,
each holds a duty to contribute defense costs when one of them paid more than its
share.47 The court made this determination in part on notions of equitability. It seemed
to believe that holding differently would somehow reward those who failed to pay, and
37. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997).
38. Id. at 127.
39. Id. at 130.
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
42. Id. §§ 6901-6992.
43. Sharon Steel Corp., 931 P.2d at 130.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 130-31.
46. Id. at 131. The trial court determined that "all three insurance companies had a duty to defend."
Aetna then continued to pay defense costs, as required by its policies, and ultimately paid out about ninety-
five percent of the total amount of costs. Hartford contributed about five percent, and AMICO contributed
nothing. In order to release themselves from future obligations, AMICO and Hartford later reached a
settlement agreement with Sharon Steel and the Liquidating Trust. Aetna then filed a cross-claim against the
other two insurance companies for indemnification for the defense costs that it paid out for the Liquidating
Trust. The trial judge ruled that Hartford and AMICO's settlement agreement extinguished Aetna's right for
indemnification. This ruling brought the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Id.
47. Id. at 138.
2004]
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it would conflict with the court's general policy of "encouraging prompt payment to the
insured....'48
Furthermore, and most important for this analysis, the court also stated that the best
approach to determine indemnification is a method that looks at the time-on-the-risk of
each insurer and the policy limits.49 The court viewed this as the most equitable result
to the insurers. The court also ruled that when it could determine what defense costs
were needed for actions that took place outside the policies, these defense costs were to
be bom by the insurer.
51
The New Jersey Supreme Court also adopted this approach, but it did so for
somewhat different reasons. The court approached the question in Owens-Illinois, Inc.
v. United Insurance Co.,52 a case involving asbestos and coverage under liability
-insurance policies. In its attempt to determine a manner of insurance liability allocation
under a continuous trigger theory, the court stated:
Among the factors that we should consider is the extent to which our decision will
make the most efficient use of the resources available to cope with environmental
disease or damage. One of the principles of such decision-making is to provide
incentives that parties should engage in responsible conduct that will increase, not
• 53
decrease, available resources.
The court pointed to a general theory in insurance that insurance companies exist to
transfer risks.54 The insurance company accepts risks through liability and can then
spread them out through reinsurance. 55 Because they can do this, the law should not
discourage parties from acquiring insurance in order to cover all of their risks. 56 In
relying on these two factors and what it regarded as "simple justice," 57 the court
determined that the best method of allocation for spreading the risk was a mixture of
time-on-the-risk and the degree of risk assumed.
58
Adopting this approach shows a concern for the equity of insurance allocation to
each insurer, but fails to consider the ramifications for the cleanup. If each insurer only
needs to pay its time-on-the-risk computed with the limitations of its policy, then it
could take a significant amount of time to calculate these costs. Courts would need to
48. Sharon Steel Corp., 931 P.2d at 138.
49. Id. at 140.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 141.
52. 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).




57. Id. at 992. But see, e.g., Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 919 (Haw.
1994) (stating its own theory of simple justice in asserting that equity requires allocation among all insurers
relative to the time periods in which they provided coverage, thereby adopting the time-on-the-risk approach).
58. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 650 A.2d at 995. The court revisited the issue in Carter-Wallace Inc. v. Admiral
Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116 (N.J. 1998). The issue in this case pertained to how to apply the holding of wens-
Illinois to excess insurers in continuous trigger liability cases. The court determined again that the best
method of allocation between primary and excess insurers would be a mixed time-on-the-risk and degree of
risk assumed approach. Id. at 1124.
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sift through a myriad of information presented by both the insurer and the insured.
Fortunately, in the case above, Aetna already paid most of the defense costs and only
sought indemnification from the other two insurance companies. This presumably
meant that no delay in cleanup occurred. However, in other cases, this decision could
result in long delays as the insurers attempt to work with the insured to determine each
one's exact liability for defense costs that, in turn, would result in longer delays for the
cleanup efforts.
III. OREGON GOEs FURTHER
The Oregon Legislature needed to choose among these three options in order to
settle the question of insurance allocation in the state. I propose that the real reason the
Oregon Legislature chose to pass Senate Bill 297 rests in part on the general
composition of the state's industry and its citizens. The relevant portion of the statute
reads:
An insurer with a duty to pay defense or indemnity costs, or both, to an insured for an
environmental claim under a general liability insurance policy that provides that the
insurer has a duty to pay all sums arising out of a risk covered by the policy, mustpay
all defense or indemnity costs, or both, proximately arising out of the risk pursuant to
the applicable terms of its policy, including its limit of liability, independent and
unaffected by other insurance that may provide coverage for the same claim.59
Environmental protection in the Pacific Northwest is one of the primary concerns
for many of its citizens. With large wilderness areas, a significant forestry and fishing
base, and dozens of lakes, a clean environment in Oregon stands as one of the most
pressing issues facing Oregon citizens. It remains possible to surmise that a clean
environment can mean much more than a thriving natural resource-based industry; it
can also result in greater tourism. People flock to the Oregon wilderness to engage in
what they view as typical Oregon activities: fly fishing, mountain climbing, snow
skiing, water skiing, kayaking, and hiking. Without a clean environment and idyllic
setting, these activities lose some of the luster that can attract out-of-state and foreign
tourists. Prior to the passage of the new statute, the lack of a clear rule of allocation
threatened the well-being of many Oregonians. According to the Oregon Department
of Environmental Quality, approximately 550 sites throughout the state are already
designated as contaminated enough to warrant investigation and cleanups.6 1 Because
judges and juries, along with constituents and legislators, harbor these concerns, recent
Oregon case law seems to adhere to the general pro-policyholder and pro-environment
policy set out in the new statute. These cases serve as a precursor to the statute and its
policy implications.
59. OR. REv. STAT. § 465.480(3)(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
60. See, e.g., Christopher R. Hermann et al., The Unanswered Question of Environmental Insurance
Allocation in Oregon Law, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1131, 1136 (2003).
61. Id. at 1131.
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A. The Adoption of a Pro-Environment Policy Through Oregon Case Law
One of the first cases to adopt a real pro-environment approach came in Lane
Electric Cooperative Inc. v. Federated Rural Electric Insurance Corp.62 In this case,
the Oregon Court of Appeals determined, among other things, that cleanup costs due to
groundwater contamination constituted covered property damage in insurance
policies. 63 Here, a gasoline tank leaked fuel into the groundwater. 64  The plaintiff
cleaned the area and sought coverage from its insurance company.65 The insurance
company asserted that contamination of the groundwater constituted physical injury to
the property not "within the meaning of the policy."66 The court then examined basic
rules of insurance policy interpretation to reach its conclusion. The court specifically
applied the rule that language of a policy enjoys interpretation according to its plain and
ordinary meaning, and a policy is to be construed according to its purpose and the
implication that the policyholder would assume it to embrace. 67 The court then simply
stated, "Ground water is tangible property. When it is contaminated, its quality is
injured physically and is 'damaged."' 68 With this holding, the Oregon Court of Appeals
seemed to set the course for the generally pro-environment policy followed later by the
Oregon Supreme Court and embraced by the legislature in the passage of Senate Bill
297.
Subsequently, in 1994, the Oregon Court of Appeals made another decision to
accompany the general pro-environment stance that the court made in 1992. In St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Inc. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 69 the
Oregon Court of Appeals determined that demands from a regulatory agency and a suit
brought in court triggered the duty to defend. The facts show that McCormick &
Baxter operated wood treatment plants in Portland and used certain chemicals which
later leaked into the soil and groundwater, contaminating these areas and surface
water.7 1  The contamination occurred because of surface impoundments where
McCormick & Baxter stored wastewater from the wood treatment process. 7 2 Later on,
McCormick & Baxter learned that some of the contaminants leaked through the surface
impoundments into the groundwater and soil. 73  They then notified the Oregon
62. 834 P.2d 502 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
63. Id. at 505.
64. Id. at 503.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 505.
67. Id.
68. Lane Electric, 834 P.2d at 505.
69. 870 P.2d 260 (Or. Ct. App. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 923 P.2d 1200, 1218 (Or. 1996).
70. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 870 P.2d 260, 266 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994).
7 1. Id. at 263.
72. These were standard for the industry. Id.
73. Id. Evidence also showed that during a labor dispute in 1949 or 1950, around 50,000 gallons of
creosote spilled into the soil when someone opened a storage tank's flange bolt. Additional damage also
occurred "by overflow from storage tanks, by equipment failures, and by stormwater runoff from treated
products and equipment, which were coated with preservatives. Preservatives also dripped and spilled onto
unprotected soil." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 923 P.2d 1200,
1204 (Or. 1996).
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Department of Environmental Quality about the contamination and entered into a
consent decree for cleanup of the contaminated area. 74 After over $2 million in cleanup
costs, McCormick & Baxter went to its insurers for indemnification. 75 Three of the
insurance companies argued that their duty to defend only arose when there was an
actual suit for recovery of cleanup costs in a court of law and not in an agency
proceeding.76  McCormick & Baxter asserted a duty to defend in administrative
proceedings as well as in court cases. The court agreed with McCormick & Baxter and
concluded "suit" as broad enough to cover administrative proceedings.
77
In its holding, the court relied on the fact that due to the type of administrative
proceedings that governed the environmental cleanup, McCormick & Baxter needed to
pay. The court stated, "The fact that it chose to try to gain a more favorable resolution
by cooperation instead of litigation does not mean that the agency was not making a
claim that [McCormick & Baxter] was responsible for damages." 78 By choosing to
begin cleanup right away and cooperate with the agencies, McCormick & Baxter began
its cleanup efforts earlier than would usually occur through litigation. Ultimately, no
matter what route it went, environmental proceedings required that McCormick &
Baxter do some type of cleanup. Therefore, because McCormick & Baxter chose to
cooperate with the agencies rather than litigate the matter, the court appeared unwilling
to punish them for taking this pro-environment stance. 79  McCormick & Baxter
harbored responsibility for the damage, no matter which way the damage occurred.
Because of this, the court determined that the administrative proceedings remained the
same as an actual court case, thus triggering the insurance companies' duty to defend.
80
Again in 1996, the Oregon Supreme Court rendered one of its most important
decisions on environmental policy, determining the meaning behind "accident" in these
policies. 81 This case came up on appeal before the Oregon Supreme Court from the
case just discussed. The court divided the pertinent policies into three categories:
"caused-by-accident" policies, "occurrence-based" policies, and policies with pollution
exclusions. 82  For purposes of analysis here, I will only address the "caused by
accident" policies.
The "caused by accident" policies essentially stated that the insurance policies
issued with that stipulation could only cover third-party property damage caused by
accident. 83  The insurers wanted the court to attach a temporal limit on the term
"accident," suggesting that it meant something more sudden that could be restricted in a
74. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 870 P.2d at 263. McCormick & Baxter held responsibility for
cleanup at a site in California. McCormick & Baxter worked with the California Department of Health
Services which determined that McCormick & Baxter violated the California Hazardous Waste Control Act,
and the agency told McCormick & Baxter of the penalties that it would face should it not cleanup the area. Id.
75. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 923 P.2d at 1203-04.




80. Id. at 266.
81. St. Paul Fire & Marine Co., 923 P.2d at 1213.
82. Id. at 1209.
83. Id. at 1211.
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definite time period. 84 McCormick & Baxter alternatively sought a determination that
would show "accident" meant simply "any event that results in unexpected, or
unforeseen, consequences."'85 The word "accident" remained undefined in all of the
policies, therefore leaving it to the court to determine.
The court looked to the common meaning of the word "accident" and prior case
law to determine that the contamination-causing events described by McCormick &
Baxter all remained accidents. 86 It stated, "Based on our precedents, an 'accident' is an
'incident or occurrence that happened by chance, without design and contrary to
intention and expectation."' 87 Because the evidence presented by McCormick & Baxter
showed that all the spills and leaks were unintentional, so was the environmental harm
that resulted.88 McCormick & Baxter remained unaware that the contaminants would
leak into the soil and groundwater, and because of this the action remained
unintentional. 89 It therefore amounted to an accident, as required by the policy.
90
The significance of this decision shows that the term "accident" can mean any
unintended event, not a temporally-defined event. Because of this definition, events
that occur in the regular course of business can constitute accidents if they remained
unintentional. This holding makes significant contributions to sound environmental
policy because it helps establish that unknown events that cause contamination can still
be accidental, even if the act itself was deliberate. The act can be deliberate, as it is
done in the regular course of business (as McCormick & Baxter used the surface
impoundments deliberately). If the act delivers unintentional results that cause
contamination, the insured is covered. If the act delivers expected and intended results
that the insured knows could cause contamination, then he is not covered. This decision
illustrates that a company can engage in its normal business activities without hindrance
from insurance policies that put a temporal qualifier on the word "accident."
' 91
Finally, in 1999, the Oregon Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act92 took another
step to establish a pro-environment policy for the state. This Act in part established that
any written direction, request, or agreement by the Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would be the equivalent
of a lawsuit as the term is used in general liability insurance policies. 93 Through the
adoption of this position, the Oregon Legislature made it considerably easier for those
with a claim for indemnification to receive funds from their insurance companies. The
companies would no longer need to wait for the commencement of an actual lawsuit to
receive defense costs; rather, they could receive funding as soon as the DEQ or EPA
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1212-13.
87. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 923 P.2d at 1213 (quoting Finley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 388 P.2d
21, 26 (Or. 1963)).
88. Id. at 1214.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See also Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 931 (Colo. 1999) (stating that the
term "sudden" in a "sudden, unintended and unexpected" exception clause contained enough ambiguity so as
to be construed against the insurer, and therefore did not contain a temporal implication).
92. OR. REV. STAT. § 465.480 (2001).
93. Id.
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issued a direction, request, or agreement. This thus allows the cleanup to begin sooner
as the company does not need to wait in the long court queue to receive its funds.
These past few cases and the Oregon Environmental Cleanup Assistance Act thus
helped establish the pro-policyholder and pro-environment landscape in the state.
These instances would then help ease the way for the introduction and eventual passage
of Senate Bill 297 in 2003.
B. All-Sums Approach through Statute as Opposed to Case Law
Adoption of an all-sums approach evidently means that a significant amount of
time will be saved between the discovery of the contaminated area and the time of the
cleanup. Rather than a requirement that each business or individual seek payments
from each different insurance company, as with time-on-the-risk, the business or
individual holds the power to seek these funds from just one company. The company
can begin the cleanup without the necessary wait time required by extensive litigation
with each insurance company. The way the statute works shows that the business
obtains all the funds up to the policy's limit from one insurer, and then that insurer can
seek indemnification from any other insurer who may also hold liability for part of the
cost. This emanates no unfairness to the insurers, as they are not required to distribute
any more money than the original limit of the policy. The insurers wrote the contract,
and thus harbor responsibility for all the limits that these contracts entail. In its
adoption of the statute, the Oregon Legislature put no new liabilities on these insurance
companies, but merely clarified the interpretation of already existing contracts.
However, the Oregon Legislature went further than this. In its adoption of the
statute, the legislature showed that it harbored a desire to rid the state of environmental
contamination as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the passage of a statute, rather than
a judicial decision, seems to show that the effort reflects a statewide consensus, rather
than one held just by the judiciary. Although both methods-the all-sums approach
decided through case law and the all-sums approach adopted through a statute-
generate much of the same results, they remain fundamentally different. One emanates
from judges deciding an issue immediately before them, and the other originates with
representatives elected by the people attempting to alleviate present and future
problems.
C. What the Bill Could Mean for Future Claims and the Future of the State
The real significance of this bill will undoubtedly unfold within the next few years
as companies and individuals around the state move forward to take advantage of it.
This will mean faster cleanup of contaminated sites thus generating greater health
throughout the state. Furthermore, companies will hold the ability to move on the claim
right away, fix the site according to plans laid out by DEQ, and see the remedy through
to the end of the cleanup. To illustrate the amount of time that it can take before a
company could achieve resolution of its claims before the statute, one example arises in
the case of McCormick & Baxter.94 In 1988, McCormick & Baxter paid out over $2
94. See supra Part III.A.
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million in cleanup costs and then filed for bankruptcy.95 A year earlier, McCormick &
Baxter looked to its insurance companies for indemnification with regard to its cleanup
costs. 96 The entire case finally ended in 1996.
97
If companies like McCormick & Baxter held the ability to collect right away under
the provisions of the new statute, all this litigation might remain unnecessary. The
statute allows them to get the money immediately and perhaps save them from
bankruptcy. Companies in Oregon, like McCormick & Baxter, paid into these
insurance policies for years, expecting indemnification for cleanup should the need
arise. This new law will now allow them to receive the benefits of these insurance
policies they once held, and it will allow them to effectuate a more efficient cleanup of
contaminated areas to the betterment of the entire state.
As companies move to take advantage of this new statute, smaller companies and
private individuals who also hold these policies could face consequences. Unable to
afford suit expenses and without the time to endure lengthy litigation, some individuals
may decide to handle the situation themselves once their insurance companies refuse to
indemnify them under the policies. This could even entail a declaration of bankruptcy.
Now with the all-sums approach written into statute, individuals with smaller claims
can move forward right away in exercising their rights. Again, the statute will allow for
faster cleanup as even those with smaller claims can take advantage of its remedial
effects.
However, the repercussions of the bill do not end with the individuals and
companies who harbor claims against their insurance companies. The bill's
consequences extend much farther than this as each of these cleanups near completion.
With each cleanup and containment of environmental degradation, the state obtains a
healthier environmental standard. Cleaner lakes, rivers, forests, and any area in general
means a chance for other industries to thrive as well. These cleanup efforts impact the
entire state.
IV. OREGON AS A MODEL FOR UNDECIDED STATES
The passage of Senate Bill 297 in Oregon allows the state to stand as a model for
other states yet to determine the allocation issue under comprehensive general liability
insurance policies. Leaving the matter undecided creates a potential for calamitous
consequences as sites remain damaged and environmental destruction continues.
98
95. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 870 P.2d 260, 263 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994).
96. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 923 P.2d 1200 (Or.
1996).
97. See id.
98. See Frona M. Powell, Insuring Environmental Cleanup: Triggering Coverage for Environmental
Property Damage under the Terms of a Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, 71 NEB. L. REV.
1194, 1195 (1992). This article states:
The mammoth price tag for cleaning up the nation's worst hazardous waste sites encourages
parties to litigate because the costs of litigating are often less than the costs of remedying
hazardous waste contamination. But litigation does not further the goal of a clean environment.
Rather, it consumes resources that could be spent on cleanup while postponing an ultimate solution
to the problem of hazardous waste contamination.
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When companies remain tied up in litigation in their attempt to determine who needs to
pay for the cleanup, further degradation occurs across the landscape. It remains crucial
to the well-being of affected sites that undecided states determine this matter as soon as
possible. The faster that a cleanup can occur, the better it comes for the general well-
being of the state. Allowing these sites to remain untouched as companies battle it out
in litigation creates the potential for dire environmental degradation.
Furthermore, those states that remain undecided should look to Oregon's Senate
Bill 297, as it creates a remedy most conducive to quicker cleanups. Adopting the all-
sums approach through case law illustrates a step in the right direction, but states should
affirmatively follow the Oregon approach and adopt the all-sums rule with a statute. A
statute makes things more concrete than case law. Even though stare decisis standards
provide binding precedent, this precedent can always be overturned later. It takes a
greater effort to overturn a statute. In addition, the adoption of an approach through
case law takes a lot of time and an incredible amount of money. The court process is
slow, and parties find it necessary to front large sums of money in order to get things
underway. Meanwhile, as the issues get laid out in the court, the damaged sites remain
uncleaned.
Finally, following Oregon's approach establishes a very strong pro-environment
policy. A statute passed by representatives of the people shows the concern of the state
as a whole. When the Oregon senators and representatives met in Salem to decide this
issue and hammer it out on the table, they accomplished much more than just a method
for allocation. They established a pro-environment policy, they adopted an approach
for the betterment of the state, and they established Oregon as a model for the rest of the
country to look to when trying to determine their own set of environmental standards
and guidelines.
V. CONCLUSION
Environmental cleanup will continue to symbolize one of the major concerns for
each state as the effects of pollution and past harmful practices come to realization.
Most of the time, damage caused from past practices can take years before it actually
surfaces. Because of this delay, the harmful effects of some practices can cause
considerable damage to a state's natural environment. Rules like the one adopted by the
Oregon Legislature in Senate Bill 297 stand as attempts to help correct the devastating
results of years of environmental degradation. Because the Oregon Legislature adopted
an approach equitable both to the insurance companies that drafted the policies and the
policyholders who paid premiums on these policies, all states yet to reach a conclusion
on this matter should adopt Oregon's approach. The Oregon approach remains the best
for all those involved, and it creates the optimum inroad into a cleaner, healthier
environment.
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